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pAbstract
Innovation policies are considered the long-term strategy to overcome the present
systemic crisis. But this crisis is questioning such policies, their presuppositions and
institutional arrangements. This questioning includes the Triple Helix theory and its
impact on research and innovation policies. The goal is to examine how this theory can
respond to theoretical and practical challenges, how the theory needs to evolve in
order to fit the present context. The criticism focuses on growing worldwide
standardization of research and innovation policies and their long-term impact on
innovation. Restoring and increasing research diversity is urgent for sustained
innovation. One solution is to add ‘society’ as a fourth helix. The problem is to clarify
what ‘society’ stands for in this context. The paper studies three different institutional
arrangements, France, Germany, and Japan, because these three cases can learn from
each other and contribute to progress in the Helix theory itself. Potential reforms are
summarized in some policy recommendations.
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Diversity; Governance; France; Germany; JapanMultilingual abstracts
Please see Additional file 1 for translation of the abstract into the five official working
languages of the United Nations and Portuguese.
Background
The Triple Helix theory in a new context
The crisis, which erupted in 2007, is systemic because it has been and still is financial,
economic, social, political, and monetary. It also transformed the international and
regional balance of power and generated new insecurities and uncertainties. It is finally
systemic also because it cannot be isolated from intensifying environmental con-
straints, from rising costs of energy to climate change. In fact, this situation is not a
crisis because no one can expect to return to a new version of the initial situation. It is
a transition toward a new, still largely unpredictable, situation. This conjuncture deeply
transforms the performance and reliability of economic policies and theories, as well
management methodologies at the level of firms, governments, and international insti-
tutions. This highly complex situation does not only question the theoretical and prac-
tical presuppositions of these policies and practices but also their institutional
environment, the conditions of their performance. In this context, the established2014 Rieu; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
icense (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
rovided the original work is properly cited.
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the role of innovation in the evolution of industrial societies have become a growing
object of inquiry and scrutiny. Innovation is often used as a magic wand to solve all
problems. It is expected to restore or sustain the competitiveness of firms and nations
in the hope of devising a new positive cycle: the emergence of new companies and even
industries, creating new jobs and high employment, leading to new taxes on these
profits and salaries in order to finance social programs as well as research and
innovation policies. Innovation is our present panacea.
In his latest work, Godin (2008) explains that innovation is a recent collective pas-
sion, that this passion might be an intellectual trend dissimulating the intricate pro-
blems facing industrial societies. Benoît Godin does not mean that innovation is an
ideology that should be discarded or can be replaced. Because no alternative theories
are readily available to respond to the present situation, research and innovation pro-
cesses and theories need to be reexamined within the present context. This paper con-
centrates not on innovation itself but on the Triple Helix theory because it provides a
concept and an institutional arrangement designed to describe and foster innovation
processes. The Triple Helix (TH) theory never really was a magic wand: it was a
method for studying highly complex processes taking shape in given social systems.
One reason, among others, for this disenchantment with innovation is found in some
counterproductive effects of the TH theory. The intent of the paper is to examine the
present state of the theory and its uses.
As metaphor, the TH theory can be summarized as the DNA of advanced industrial
societies, of those industrial societies, which have been since the 1980s responding to
increased competition and other constraints (including environmental) by intensifying
innovation processes. In this type of society, innovation is not reduced to technological
innovation or scientific progress, to any linear process from discovery in laborator-
ies to applications in the market. Innovation is a complex institutional process: it
names the emerging effects of interactions between universities, government, and
economy, the three spheres of activities where these interactions take place. This
theory is both a conceptual construction and a model of management and reform of
these three institutions in order to intensify their interactions. This model has been
adopted and adapted by a growing number of governments, nations, and regions
since the mid-1990s.
The present systemic crisis is further reinforcing interest in the model and criticism
of the theory. Both the theory and the model raise many problems at different levels,
mainly at the conceptual, empirical, and political levels. The main problem is the
requirement to take into account the institutional and historical context in which this
arrangement is emerging because this context has obviously a strong impact on the im-
plementation of the model. A major step forward for solving this problem was the idea
raised during the 2002 Triple Helix conference in Copenhagen to introduce ‘society’ as
a fourth helix. Adding this new helix expressed the institutional recognition achieved
by science and technology studies and their growing role in policy design. The report
by Leydesdorff and Etzkowitz (2003), the two originators of the theory, discussed this
idea and this discussion opened a new range of debate and research on the helix. The
problem was and still is to establish what ‘society’ really means, or stands for, in a re-
formed Triple Helix model and theory.
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Introducing ‘society’ raises a problem without any easy solutions. ‘Civil society’, ‘social
impact’, and ‘social problems’ have always been major concerns. But, more generally,
‘society’ stands for the context of formation of the TH arrangement, its context of adop-
tion and adaptation for best performance. At stake are the particular conditions and
level of implementation of such an arrangement in a given social system. The theory
itself can only develop on the basis of the different cases it can describe, explain, and
compare. This is the reason why this paper tries to further research the theory by com-
paring three cases, France, Germany, and Japan, because they are responding to each
other. Studying and comparing cases in order to rebuild the theory is a departure from
a former conception of the theory taking for granted that Silicon Valley was the typical
model of interactions between university, government, and industry. This was the
theme of the 2011 Triple Helix conference in Stanford: ‘Silicon Valley: global model or
unique anomaly?’ The overall answer was that, in this present evolution, Silicon Valley
is neither unique nor an anomalya. It is not a norm but a case among others. The
present skepticism about innovation requires setting the theory and its model in dif-
ferent contexts and perspectives. Finally, TH theory is a typical Schumpeterian
innovation: it keeps a strong heuristic value but new versions need to be extracted from
cases formulated and debated. Research simply has to progress. Some policy recom-
mendations conclude the paper.Results and discussion
The case of France
The case of France is of particular interest because it is furthest removed from Silicon
Valley, which remains until today a sort of French utopiab. What fascinates the French
in Silicon Valley is in fact an ideal type of Triple Helix. Paradoxically, no reference to
the TH theory is explicitly made in French policy debates in innovation and competiti-
venessc. Few researchers even show real interest for the theory, and most of them are
related to the Ecole des mines in Parisd. The reason for this apparent lack of interest is
well known: until today, the French state apparatuse controls research activities, their
budgets, and even the careers of researchers, through its monopoly of universities and
through its extensive range of public research institutions. These public institutions are
first of all training institutions: the best known are the ‘grandes écoles’, highly selective
national professional schoolsf. Secondly, the major public research institutions are the
CNRS (Centre national de la recherche scientifique), the INRA (Institut national de la
recherche agronomique), the INSERM (Institut national de la santé et la recherche
médicale), the CEA (Commissariat à l'énergie atomiqueg), and many others, including
their legions of state engineers and public researchers. These public institutions cover
all fields of research, from physics to public health, agriculture, communication, and
energy, including human sciences. These two types of public institutions have historic-
ally given birth, and are still closely related, to all major industries (mining, transport,
energy, etc.) and industrial firms or conglomerates. These institutions are not only part
of the state apparatus but they constitute its hegemony on French economy and soci-
ety. They are an expression of French sovereignty: they are sovereign institutions inter-
twined with sovereign industries.
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power, industrial development, and economic progress have been the goal of this
apparatus since the early 19th century. But, beyond common rhetoric, there is both a
divide and close relation between these teaching and research institutions and industry.
Students from the ‘grandes écoles’ are trained in science in order to later ‘apply’ their
competence to industry. By contrast, innovation processes are considered the respon-
sibility and role of industries. According to this imagined and official ‘linear model’,
state research institutions are in charge of ‘science’, the source of ‘basic’ or ‘fundamental’
knowledge, which is made available and distributed in various stages throughout the
French economy and society. Even today, innovation tends to be still treated as ‘applica-
tion’. This conceptual and institutional framework is organized according to a center/per-
iphery model. The center, research, and its peripheries, applications, i.e., innovation, are
treated as two distinct types of activity developed and organized according to different
values, goals, and methods. They belong to two different cultures unified by the same con-
ception of the nation and the state, with two radically distinct experiences of economic
competition. At best, innovation processes are considered a field of interactions and medi-
ations between research and industry, public and private institutions, the state, and the
‘market’. How these interactions really happen is considered obvious and largely left
unknownh: people just move from one to the other.
This conceptual and institutional framework has well-known negative effects still
strong until today. Either large firms have developed their own research and develop-
ment activities - in this case, they often associate, even integrate, public researchers
and laboratories according to their internal interests and strategies - or large firms sup-
pose that public research institutions should provide access to their basic research be-
cause it is public and financed by taxes on their revenues. This framework reproduces
the divide between science and technology, public and private, and research and
innovation. The structure of knowledge activities tends to reproduce the structure of
the state apparatus. This framework is an obstacle to the level of interactions driving
both research and innovation activities today in effective knowledge economies. In
France, two worlds, two different sets of values and conceptions of knowledge, and two
epistemologies, are in conflict with each other.
This is well known and well denied at the same time. The Triple Helix theory has pre-
cisely the goal to address this situation and search for solutions and reforms. This double
denial is reinforced in France by the social sciences, which are considered having full legit-
imacy in explaining and managing the French situationi: political science (public policy
studies in particular), sociology, economics and to a lesser degree history, and philosophy
of science and technology. They do not reach the ‘deep state’, the level at which the state
apparatus operates. These disciplines and their institutionalized demarcation reproduce
the denial. They have been strongly criticized by researchers like Michel Callon and
Bruno Latour, who explained that investigation and innovation processes should be
analyzed in a completely different conceptual framework. What is both well known
and denied is clear: through these public research institutions, some of them presti-
gious, the French state apparatus controls the long-term evolution of the French
economy and society. This established network of power is reproducing itself over
time at the expense of economic development and social progress. This network of
power tends and tacitly intends to reduce the disruptive potentials of research and
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corrupt.
At a certain age and level of recognition, through various rewards and honorary posi-
tionsj, public researchers in France integrate a network of power associating top man-
agers of big firms, the high administration of strategic ministries, and the scientific
community elite. Coming from the same national professional schools (grandes écoles),
they tend to converge at a given moment of their professional lifek. This power network
is embedded within the state apparatus: it reinforces and legitimizes its control on the
economy and society. This explains why the state apparatus is in the position of macro-
managing the interactions between research institutions and the main firms framing
the whole economy and presiding over its evolution. It also explains the strong divide
within the French economy between the large national companies, today largely priva-
tizedl, and its periphery of medium and small size companies, which do receive the
same assistance from government, but do not have access to the same level of techno-
logical, financial, and legal resources as large companies at the center of the French
economic system. They do have the same status but do not share the same privileges,
even if they provide around 65% of employment in France. This explains why high-tech
companies and new companies in general do not find in France the proper financial
and fiscal conditions for growth. They do not belong to the same economy and do not
play by the same rules.
In this situation, reform carries a high political cost. It is difficult to imagine that the
French state apparatus would soon renounce its power to control the evolution of the
nation, which is the source of its legitimacy. Without any doubt, the power of the state
apparatus over the production and distribution of knowledge explains the present lack
of competitiveness of the French industry and the relative weakness of its small and
medium size companies, which do not have the same level of recognition and support
than the firms associated to national networks of power. But this also explains why
French major companies (EDF, Schneider, Areva, Total, Saint-Gobain, BNP-Paribas,
Lafarge, etc.) are very successful outside of France where they have developed partner-
ships and participate in projects free from national administrative constraints and
power structure. This situation also explains that graduates from the best schools tend
or wish to emigrate in order to create their companies and develop their careers out-
side French constraints.
Finally, this close network associating the high administration, top management of
big firms, and head of the scientific community, explains the decision taken in the
1970s to create a national system of nuclear energy facilities with the goal to assure
France's long-term energy independence and sovereigntym. The level of investment has
been so high that it drastically reduced public and private investment capacity in the
‘new technologies’, which were picking up in all industrial nations, including France, in
the late 1970s and early 1980sn. After the pressure of the energy crisis all along the
1970s, with the promise of a secure supply of electricity by nuclear plants, the incentive
to design energy-saving policies and processes, to invest in alternative energies, lost
urgency. Private companies and public institutions could no longer consider these fields
of R&D as profitable long-term investment. The consequences of these decisions, the
responsibility of these aggregates of power, explain the present situation of the French
economy combined with the state of research in France. The French nuclear energy
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over the misleading vision of the late 1960s and the post-Fukushima debate.
Situating the present analysis is important. French science is known for the quality of
its researchers in mathematics, biology, economics, or physics. But, this is today a par-
tial and misleading epistemology. In the present knowledge regime, top researchers do
not compensate for either the weakness of the French national system of innovation or
the weakness of the French industry measured every month and for years by its trade
deficit. The tall trees of Areva, TGV, and Airbus cannot hide the meager innovation
forest. Once again, this situation is perfectly well known. But successive presidents and
governments have been unable and finally unwilling to confront this situation, to estab-
lish a research and innovation policy targeting specifically French small and medium
enterprises (SMEs). They all tried and finally renounced. In order to stay in power and
govern (‘to steer the country’), they cannot afford to confront the combined power of
the high administration and top industries, which are driving the long-term evolution
of the whole nation. They learn to take into account and then follow their aggregated
interests. The political risk has always been too high because students, professors, and
their syndicates are also against any reforms, which would transform in depth the
status quo. The tacit hope of the best students is to join the power structure (or leave
the country). Any strong reform would reduce their specific interests and their poten-
tial access to the French power structure.
After an initial trial period intended to show the population that its vote is respected,
governments finally convert to the established hierarchy of influence and interests. The
government is reduced to the role of interface, adjustment, and negotiation between
the population, the economy, and the administration. There is therefore a sort of
French Triple Helix. But this French version is reduced to the interaction between
government, the state apparatus, and the economic systemp. In this distorted type of
Triple Helix, two major instances and sectors of activities are absent and repressed:
first, research, innovation, and education activities; secondly, French civil society. The
first one, the knowledge sector, is under the control of the state apparatus; the second
is supposed to be expressed by the political process. Reforming France does not sup-
pose a social movement but major epistemological progress based on effective know-
ledge of the French system of power.
In contrast: the case of Germany
Therefore, in its standard definition, the Triple Helix theory is highly disruptive regar-
ding France's institutional system. TH theory supposes the existence of an advanced so-
cial system in which three distinct strings or specific spheres are interacting with each
other: information circulates between these spheres and these exchanges generate new
knowledge (innovation) in each sphere and in the system itself. TH theory is just a con-
ceptual construction. But this construct carries a theory of society and a program to
analyze social systems and their evolution regarding knowledge activities. TH theory
cannot be dismissed because it is built-in in the evolution of advanced industrial so-
cieties. In the case of France, repressed but not ignored, TH theory adequately de-
scribes the directionality of recent reforms of universities and research institutions,
their relations to industry and to local economies. It explains the search at the local
level for an increased degree of ‘autonomy’ from the Ministry of Higher Education and
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explains also the limitations and final failures of these reforms. In its official sense,
‘autonomy’ means a more effective local management of resources but no real emanci-
pation from central administrative control. It explains why these reforms are in-
adequate by comparison with those made on other nations in the last 15 years, in fact
since the 1980s when the function of universities in social systems started to change.
From this point of view, the case of France needs to be contrasted with the case
Germany. Referring to Silicon Valley might provide some ideal standard, but it surely
hides the present state of France, as well as the ongoing evolution of the San Francisco
Bay area. France needs to be compared to Germany in order to learn from it. The main
difference is the institutional system, mainly the difference between the French
regionalization and the German federal system. Regionalization in France replicates at
the level of regions the same national institutional model; a federal model belongs to a
different logic. Due to its federal institutional structure established after 1945, Germany
is today composed of sixteen Länder, each with a strong historical and economic iden-
tity, with different but also shared interests, with a common vision of Germany, of its
power and destiny. Today Germany is free from a centralized state apparatus having as
its goal to rule the nation according to its own interest and perspective. As explained
by Ulrich Hilpertq, within each Land, local characteristics and interests have made pos-
sible collaboration, interaction, and negotiation between universities, government, and
industries.
A sort of spontaneous version of Triple Helix theory was already in place when the
German federal government under Chancellor Gerhard Schröder decided in the late
1990s to reshape the German social and economic system in order to overcome the
transition period opened by Germany's reunification, to stabilize the adaptations and
reforms, which had been necessary in order to organize a new and extended version of
the German state. Politicians did not have any helix in mind. Because economic dispa-
rities and psychosocial resistance were still strong between former Eastern and Western
Germany, the challenge was to find the right level and establish the right local platform
for rebuilding a competitive economy, to create competence and jobs. The selection of
education, innovation, and research proved to be an optimal choice for reconstructing
a local endogenous economy merging progressively into the national economy. Nobody
pretends that TH theory brought the solution but it can certainly explain it. This com-
plex transition is not yet completed and inequities between Länder still exist. Conflicts
of power exist in Germany as everywhere else: the problem is the level at which such
conflicts are expressed and solutions negotiated. But what made the management of
this transition successful has been the tacit understanding and agreement that German
long-term economic and social reconstruction would be built on continued interactions
between universities, industries, and local governments within a regulation by a higher
political order and federal incentives.
In each Land, the population understands the role of research and innovation pro-
cesses, even if education remains a difficult challenge to create jobs and have access to
these jobs. This development path creates social problems of its own, but it also created
a tacit local consensus. This dynamics had one positive aspect: it transformed the con-
ception and role of competition between Länder because each Land is responsible for
establishing and implementing local conditions for growth, employment, and collective
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stimulate local TH-type initiatives and to regulate at the same time this new German
social and economic system within its geopolitical environment, within the European
Union, and with the main partners of this new Germany in Eastern and Western
Europe, Russia, the USA, China, and India. Based on a network of powerful nationwide
public and private foundations, the Berlin government has been able to explain, pro-
mote, and finance continuous TH-type reforms at the level of the Länder, sustained by
massive federal investment targeted toward ‘centers of excellence’, laboratories, re-
search chairs, and emerging fields of research. Germany is a paradigmatic case of a fed-
eral regulation of local industrial competitiveness based on research and innovation
processes. From the start of the present systemic crisis, this policy has been reinforced
as the best response to overcome the crisis. This is summarized by Germany's official
2009 slogan ‘Mit Forshung und Innovation aus der Krise’ (overcoming the crisis with
research and innovation)r.
The case of Germany is a powerful version of Triple Helix theory. It deserves to be
carefully studied and debated by each mature economic and social system, certainly by
French specialists in science and technology policy. ‘Regionalization’ has been a major
policy in France since the late 1960s. It was the last reform introduced in 1969 by
General de Gaulle. It was rejected by popular vote and de Gaulle chose to resign. The
French population voted against this project because the majority of the voters did not
consider that these regions would have the resources to develop economically, that in-
equities between regions would rise, and that it would also reduce the capacity of the
central government to balance these inequities. The Loi Deferre, the decentralization
law voted in 1982, was a real transfer of sovereignty to the regions. Local governments
were established. But this administrative transfer never went so far as to create or in-
duce locally the will to establish the conditions for an endogenous regional dynamic,
adapted to the local economic fabric and contrasted (not disconnected) from national
policies. These French regions did take into account their specific geo-economical en-
vironment, but with the exception of Alsace, they always stayed in the end within the
framework of a national sovereignty. They never converted to the establishment of a
full real trans-border growth area based on research and innovation activities, as ex-
emplified by the Knowledge triangle Eindhoven-Leuven-Aachen. Soon, regional politics
obscured the ambition and benefits of effective research policies. The French regions
have reproduced the national political debate and administrative model. They seem
unable and unwilling to emancipate from this model. They are for the moment unable
to establish a regional Triple Helix, to establish research and innovation activities as a
common regional platform for economic and social developments.
Of course, whatever their history and culture, nothing proves that existing adminis-
trative entities are the best territory to establish a successful research, innovation, and
training (RIT) policy. The future might be full of surprise. In the case of France, the
key model for such emancipation is the formation of a trans-regional TH policy, an
extended version of the German example, with probable success if fully experimented
and effectively implemented. Some French regions are ideally situated for this
quantum leap because it is part of their long-term history and present economy.
These trans-regional collaborations are well known: Northern France with the
Flanders and Holland, Alsace with Bad-Wurttemberg and the Basel region, the
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around Torino, the historical relations between Toulouse and Barcelona, etc.t. The
French government would need to take the lead and reorganize the state apparatus in
order to reduce administrative control. Beyond the case of France, this carries an-
other map of Europe, based on the subsidiarity principle, which contradicts the
French state and its power over French destiny. Still, the cases of France and
Germany need to be contrasted and complemented in the last part of this paper by
the case of Japan, which adds another dimension to the debate. But before reaching
this point, it is necessary to summarize why these two cases lead to a new version of
the Triple Helix theory, why some counterproductive effects of the standard theory
need to be explained and reformed.
Problem: growing standardization
The cases of France and Germany prove the descriptive and heuristic value of the
Triple Helix theory. They also contribute to a better understanding of its limitations
and presuppositions. Explicitly or not, TH theory is still inspiring strong debates, many
research, and potential institutional reforms. But the adoption and adaptation of the
model has also transformed this conceptual construct into an international norm. The
counterproductive effects of this norm have become clear and serious. To modify the
theory is to open new research and further reforms.
The first problem is an increased standardization of research, a serious problem in
time of systemic crisis. For research and other upstream activities, universities as well
as national and regional research policies, competition has greatly intensified since the
1980s. This competition now generates a growing standardization of research and
innovation activities. Researchers in advanced industrial societies tend to work on the
same fields and the same themes in institutional environments (organizations, hierar-
chies, even buildings), which tend to become very similar. The short-term and long-
term consequence of this situation is a growing standardization. This is a paradoxical
situation: research intensification reduces its diversity and innovative potentials. This
reinforces another trend: science might be universal and technology generic, we ob-
serve the emergence of various types of ‘knowledge economy’ not only in the USA and
Japan as well as in Europe, but also in China, Singapore, Korea, even slowly in Russia,
and Brazil. These various types of knowledge economy are competing with each other.
But this intensified competition is further reinforcing standardization. These problems
express the mutation of the conception, organization, and role of all knowledge acti-
vities in advanced industrial societies since the 1980s, the new ‘regime of knowledge’
in which our societies develop. All major research institutions now have the same
priorities and objectives. They have entered a mimetic competition process, which is
reinforcing itself into a convergent trajectory. The benefits are real: research
standardization facilitates worldwide cooperation of researchers, laboratories, and
research programs. But this convergence and search for ‘excellence’ also increase
frauds and misconducts.
But this standardization creates two problems: underneath global and even ‘open’
cooperation, it intensifies competition between laboratories and between nations and
regions according to their capacity not to generate new research and progress, but to
transform this new knowledge into innovations, new industries, and new products. This
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national systems of innovation, which can be observed since the 1980s, tend to replicate
the same model and therefore intensify the mimetic effect (Rieu 2008). It further inten-
sifies standardization. From the point of view of the two main challenges, intensified
environmental constraints and systemic crisis, results are below expectations. Estab-
lished conceptions of innovation and research policies do not adequately respond to
the present conjuncture. Research itself and research institutions are following a potentially
dangerous path. This is the second problem: by reducing research and innovation diversity,
self-reinforcing standardization will have a negative impact on research and innovation
evolutionary potentials and therefore on long-term progress. This does not mean that
standardization sterilizes research but reducing its diversity generates a long-term path de-
pendency on established patterns. It seems strange to defend biodiversity and at the same
time be blind to the necessity of sustaining and even increasing research diversity.
The standardization of research and the reduction of evolutionary potentials need to
be put in a broader perspective. As mentioned before, the convergence of research
fields and research organizations brings obvious benefits: it concentrates human capital
and financial resources. It rationalizes knowledge production and distribution for eco-
nomic growth and social progress. This convergence is also the result of scientific
methodologies and large-scale communication of data and research outcomes as well
as the result of the increased circulation of researchers. These positive elements cannot
be ignored when humanity is facing increased challenges; diseases; food, water, and
energy shortages; mass unemployment and unfulfilled jobs; unequal access to educa-
tion, information, and technological expertise; and industrial pollutions and climate
change, not to mention international security issues. The positive elements need today
to be evaluated in this context. This context is radically transforming the context for
science and technology policies, the goals of research and innovation.
Counterproductive effects have become an urgent issue. The first issue is the redistri-
bution of research and innovation territories since the early 2000s, accelerated by the
present systemic crisis. One observes a level of concentration of financial capital; of
legal, financial, and management expertise; and of advanced research institutions
(universities) attracting the best experts and graduate students from around the world,
creating innovation ecosystems in which large companies grow larger and in which also
innovation and new companies can breed. These world attractors are surrounded by
scientific and technological peripheries as well as innovation deserts. Since the 1980s,
this convergence has not only intensified, but it has also mutated: it might not fit the
present conjuncture. This dynamics is driven by intensified competition between econ-
omies and societies. The problem is that the USA, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, and
each West-European nation have been sharing the same diagnosis on the present world
conjuncture and have one after the other implemented a similar response to growing
environmental constraints and to the globalized competition. Since the 1990s, it is offi-
cial policy that the long-term future of each advanced industrial society has to be found
in its capacity to generate new knowledge and to translate innovation into new com-
panies and new products, which would create growth, jobs, and state revenues for
financing welfare policies and infrastructures as well as research and innovation pol-
icies. This was theorized and popularized by the pioneering work of Michael Porter
since the early 1980s. This hope for a new positive cycle is our common mythology.
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science and technology's productivity. It is becoming a trap.
Solution: to restore and increase research diversity
Reversing the trend toward standardization has for its goal to restore and possibly
increase research long-term productivity in order to meet present challenges. The
problem is to organize and sustain research diversity. Modern science, soon after birth,
became the monopoly of the modern nation stateu and to alter this historical trend is a
major challenge. Contrasting France and Germany proved how a reformed TH theory
could participate in the identification, formation, and organization of different RIT
territoriesv. Sterling (2007) proposed a conceptual framework for studying and man-
aging diversity: ‘Diversity concepts employed across the full range of sciences (…) dis-
play some combination of just three basic properties: (…) “variety”, “balance” and
“disparity”’. The variety of research traditions depends on their historical, social,
cultural, and even economic contexts. But today, saving this diversity does not mean
securing or protecting an imagined historical scientific or technical identity or tradition
(disparity). It means producing new knowledge and to innovate in a world of intensified
and mimetic competition. It means overcoming this competition by developing dif-
ferent perspectives or alternatives. There is nothing heroic to this. Restoring or creating
diversity depends first of all on the capacity of academic and research communities to
conceive and debate their own objectives, methods, and values, to find a balance bet-
ween variety and disparity. Institutional innovation and academic autonomy are the key
issues in this process. The problem is not to isolate or protect research universities
from their economic contexts and social duties. On the contrary, the problem is to give
research communities an increased capacity to negotiate with firms and government
their priorities and responsibilities.
Once extracted from neoliberal restrictions, the Triple Helix theory is able to provide
responses to this situation, as proven by the cases studied before. This interpretation of
the theory supposes that research universities do not bow or surrender to their interac-
tions with firms under the control or guidance of government. On the contrary, in full
compatibility with the TH theory, universities fulfill their duty when asserting and ex-
ploring their full role and responsibilities. Institutional innovation is certainly required,
but this does not mean that a research university should be organized and managed like
a firm as it is still frequently supposed. It simply requires stressing the requirements of
research and innovation, of teaching and training, and of the various time frames of
these activities and their specific institutional constraints. Diversity is as important for
progress in science and technology as standardization. Of course, adjustment between
the two might be difficult to manage, but the risk to differ and to develop new fields
and hypotheses are also a fundamental duty and responsibility of research communities.
Economics of knowledge is a branch of economics studying the conditions and eco-
nomic impact of innovation processes. But it cannot be extended to the life and
organization of laboratories or universities.
This implies a different conception of competition. To compete within the same
model and for the same objectives is quite different than competing on different
grounds for complementary and cumulative objectives. New modes of collaboration
and positive competition can be imagined and can also be observed in a federal system
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a regulative entity, either national or regional. Germany is a good case of such an insti-
tutional arrangement, but it does not provide a model to be easily replicated. An insti-
tutional arrangement is not a matter of choice but the outcome of a singular evolution.
Collaborative competition has become a key issue. Positive competition does not
(should not) reduce diversity but on the contrary reinforce diversity and intensify global
progress and common knowledge. In the present crisis, in order to confront rising
environmental constraints, better and shared knowledge of innovation processes,
including a reformed version of the Triple Helix theory, leads to a conception and prac-
tice of collaborative competition. It seems a big step when it is in fact a small change of
perspective. To compete is also to collaborate: what is at stake is the productivity
of these interactions in terms of discovery, innovation, and dissemination. The capacity
of local or regional entities to respond to these interactions is a political matter, which
the Triple Helix theory clarifies by providing a frame of negotiation and organization.
Porter's (2011) conception of ‘competitive advantage’ does not contradict this
conception of the Triple Helix. His theory includes implicitly this different angle.
Developed in the 1980s, in the period when neoliberal policies were implemented, his
problem did not concern the local arrangements at the source of the comparative
advantage. It was focused on the advantage itself at the level of firms capable of trans-
lating this advantage into a product or service introduced in different markets. The
emergence of this advantage and its translation into a product or service developed by
a firm were left in the shadow. In this neoliberal context, creation of SMEs, industrial
development, and economic growth were the only concern. Markets had to be opened
or created, extended, and penetrated. Economic globalization is an outcome of this
neoliberal paradigm. It revolutionized the world, but it also turned into the present
situation.
The questions today are more inquisitive and more urgent also. A proof of Porter's
theory compatibility with a new version of the Triple Helix theory is the important role
played by the idea of ‘differentiation.’ This notion encapsulates the competitive advan-
tage. What is really the difference expressed in a new product? Where does it come
from? How is it translated into potential competitiveness? Can it be reduced to a higher
performance and cheaper cost? Looking for the source of the difference is an endless
and useless task. The problem is not the source but the context in which a difference
becomes an innovation, how it takes shape and is finally translated into a new product
or service reaching a different need or expressing a desire in a population. This context
has certainly many layers and parameters. But some interactions generate a pattern and
compact between at least three distinct types of activities, knowledge, experience and
expertise, a type of exchange and enterprise, and a common or collective institution.
Among many others, these interactions transform a difference into continuing
innovation between various fields within a social system. This simply means that the
Triple Helix theory has a heuristic and epistemic function: it makes possible an analysis
of an emerging innovation and of the various interactions transforming this innovation
into an artifact embedded in a society.
In the present post-neoliberal period, one way to reverse standardization and negative
competition is to restore and intensify diversity. It is easier said than done. I am trying
to formulate a version of the Triple Helix adapted to this specific conjuncture. The
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innovations in many different fields: technological innovations as well as social, institu-
tional, ethical, managerial, legal, financial, or cultural. The idea is simple: multiple inno-
vations will at some point aggregate and lead us all beyond the present systemic crisis.
This search for new sources of innovation has been clearly expressed since the 2002
Triple Helix conference in Copenhagen. An idea was to introduce a fourth helix. This
new helix was identified with ‘society’ and ‘civil society’ in a typical science, technology,
and society (STS) approach. This solution was also expressing the growing role of social
sciences in the knowledge of science and technology processes, of their interactions
within their social, political, and economic environments. Introducing a fourth helix in
the triangle made by government, universities, and firms was to create a different
method to analyze innovation processes. This method was in the end leading to a dif-
ferent analysis and conception of society.
Giving a real content to this fourth helix is a question, which proved more difficult
than expected. First of all, the fourth helix could not be reduced to ‘culture’, to national
scientific and technical traditions, because it explains little besides what history and
sociology of science have been studying for years. To reduce this fourth helix to
‘society’ raises the problem of what ‘society’ really means in this case. Multiple answers
are available, all fully justified: connecting to civil society, solving social problems,
answering social needs, reducing inequities, easing everyday life, developing public in-
frastructure and services, creating jobs and employment, and establishing a clean and
safe environment as well as sustainable social and economic development. Other per-
spectives need to be taken into consideration, in particular Latour's (2005) analysis of
how the ‘social’ is constantly made and reinvented at the level of individuals and
groups in their own agency. In the end, what is at stake is a different conception of
democracy.
The answers are many. Introducing a fourth helix transforms the theory in many
ways. What is expected from this supplementary helix? Its function is to study,
organize, and regulate the social system in which operate interactions between univer-
sities, government and the state administration, firms, industries, and their related ser-
vices. This also includes industrial property rights and the legal structure according to
which knowledge is produced and circulates. Furthermore, the fourth helix satisfies a
real political function situated outside established political institutions. In this sense, it
manages the governance of a social system driven by a Triple Helix arrangement. This
political function regulates and reconfigures the relations between politics and tech-
nology, research and economics, civil society and research, and politics and economics.
This new political function is not a dream or utopia: it is a virtual response, an urgent
one, when our social systems need to learn how to respond to environmental con-
straints, which deeply transform their structure and affect the life of individuals and
groupsw. The virtual function anticipates institutions, which are still to be imagined. At
the same time, this mutation was actually quite predictable and is obviously required:
when science and technology concern all aspects of life in society, the way we are edu-
cated and the way we work, commute, communicate, and even reproduce, a major mu-
tation is bound to take place. All these aspects of life in society become first the target
of science and technology policies, but they also become the source and inspiration of
all these policies. This mutation is the social turn of science and technology policy.
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solution. The fourth helix is not an answer but the name of a great variety of problems
without any clear solutions for the moment. It names an open set of problems, which
questions the helix theory itself within the theory itself. Differentiation seems to be a
solution to be researched case by case. The helix theory has for goal to analyze and
explain what generates innovation within a social system and how this social system is
transformed by this innovation.
Escaping from the mimetic trap: the case of Japan
In the late 1970s, Japan was the first nation to respond to the 1973 energy crisis by
transforming its industrial policy in order to design a high value-added economy, which
could neutralize the increasing costs of energy and natural resources in general. When
in the early 2000s, Japan's power structure realized that most industrial nations were
replicating a similar pattern, Japan was the first nation having for goal to escape from
this mimetic trapx. Japan's third and fourth Basic Plans for science and technology are
the best and only cases of such a ‘social turn’. In order to learn from them, both plans
need to be rapidly put in their context. In the early 1990s, the ‘bubble’ crisis forced the
administration to restructure Japan's research system. The proliferation of programs
during the 1980s proved costly and the results were far below expectation. Because of
the amount of partners (ministries, companies, universities, etc.) involved and the fields
of research concerned, two large programs were organized in 1992 and 1993: the
Industrial Science and Technology Frontier Program and the New Sunshine Program for
new energy sources and environmental technologies. The divide between these two
large-scaled programs indicated that Japan's long-term priority was to respond to
environmental constraints by articulating green research and industry with the goal to
reshape its social and economic system.
This restructuring led to a final reform, intended to establish a new and coherent
national system of research and innovation. The goal for Japan was far more ambitious
than a comprehensive science and technology policy: the objective was to build this
policy within the institutional system and in return to adapt the institutional system to
the objectives of this policy. In 1995, a Basic Law for Science and Technology was voted:
research and innovation were established at the core of Japan's institutional system. Based
on this law, three basic plans have been developed from 1996 to 2011. Spending on sci-
ence and technology increased from 12.6 trillion yen in 1995 to 17.6 trillion for the first
plan, 21.1 trillion for the second plan, and 21 trillion for the third plan. As usual, budgets
teach little about the plans themselves, their construction, intentions, and performance.
The first Basic Plan, from fiscal 1996 to 2001, had as its goal to open a new phase: it in-
creased the public budget for science and technology by around 60% in 5 years. In spite of
Japan's systemic crisis, adequate budget was always granted. The priority was to
modernize research infrastructures and create new ones. The second Basic Plan, from
2001 to 2006, had for objective to reform in depth universities and the university system
by drawing a demarcation between public and private and national and local universities:
their ambition and role were different but complementary. Public universities received fi-
nancial and administrative autonomy: they had to become accountable for their manage-
ment, for their research and teaching performance. To stimulate research and open new
fields, a Center of Excellence (COE) program was established to provide, on a competitive
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forms is regularly below expectation and criticized, this COE program has indeed stimu-
lated innovative interdisciplinary research projects in many fields.
The first two basic plans had as their goal to reform Japan's national system of
innovation. Since 2006, a Japanese version of the Triple Helix theory was under con-
struction. In 2003, the National University Corporation Law was voted, and in 2006,
amendments to the 1947 Fundamental Law of Education led to the possibility of estab-
lishing an ‘industry-university-government’ alliance. The third Basic Plan, from 2006 to
2011, was launched in March 2006. Its conception and goals were quite different
(NISTEP 2005) from the first two plans. It was based on a large inquiry to identify the
worldwide state of research but also to take into account the effective needs of Japan's
population. Japan's Triple Helix had from the beginning a fourth leg. The goal was to
respond adequately to Japan's economic and financial situation and its social con-
straintsy: the aging of the population, the demographic decline and low birth rate, the
rising cost and scarcity of energy, climate change and other environmental constraints,
the increased competition with the Chinese economy, and growing international in-
stability. The infrastructure of the daily life of the Japanese was taken into account in
order to be reshaped.
The third plan was disrupted at mid-course by the 2007 systemic crisis. Japan was hit
where it hurt the most: its economy was partially restructured, and since 2004 and
2005, it had started to grow again. The year 2008 proved how fragile were this growth
and recovery: high-tech industries were far too dependent on foreign markets and glo-
bal economic growth. The message was brutal and clear, without easy solution: an
export-oriented economy based on higher value-added industries and products could
not anymore sustain Japan's long-term economic and social development. Either Japan's
research system had failed to generate and distribute adequate innovation or this con-
ception and role of innovation dating back to the 1980s was outdatedz. As mentioned
before, geopolitical perspective shows that all industrial nations, including recently the
USA, had been implementing the same strategy, which would soon become a dead end.
Japan found itself caught in a mimetic trap it had entered earlier than the others. Japan
had now to escape from it first. The goals of the plan, its methodology, and the concep-
tion of research and innovation had to be adapted to this situation. These revisions and
reforms led to the conception of the next plan, the fourth Basic Plan. The third plan
expressed what should be called the social turn of science and technology policy in
Japan; the fourth Plan was supposed to reach a step further by including a Japanese ver-
sion of a fourth helix.
The fourth Basic Plan was ready to be officially launched in April 2011. It was sus-
pended because of the 11 March 2011 Kanto and Tohoku earthquake, revised during
summer, and voted again in late August 2011. A major political change had happened
in between: the Democratic Party of Japan had won in August 2009 the general elec-
tion, and a Japanese version of social democracy was experimented. In this political
context, because of the systemic crisis, discussions have been more inclusive. This
fourth plan had to make a difference in order to justify the same level of public fun-
ding. The population would have to see the difference in its daily life, its standard of
living, and its level of public services. The third plan's orientation toward solving pres-
sing social problems was reinforced. A ‘society of users’ was no longer an adequate
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responding to the needs and lifestyles of Japan's population were supposed to be
created or further developed. The fourth plan was raising high expectations, at least in
political and administrative circles. It had to respond to the growing disappointment
toward science and technology policies according to a criterion of ‘social accounta-
bility’. In summary, innovation had to ‘make sense’, to produce growth, to create jobs,
and to satisfy real needs but also new attitudes, desires, and values. Social problems
were extended to societal issues. Beneath marketing and political slogans, a real prob-
lem was raised: the systemic crisis was requiring a deep revision of the economic stra-
tegy based on scientific progress and technological innovation designed in the early
1990s. In the mind of many Japanese researchers and officials, a solution was to recon-
nect to ‘society’, to envision innovation from the point of view of society.
Intense debate had been taking place since 2008 and a consensus was emergingaa.
The idea of a societal turn was opening new perspectives worth exploring. According
to this ‘new paradigm of innovation,’ in order to benefit the Japanese people, research
and innovation policies had to learn how to articulate and manage different goals
within the same policy. They have to respond to practical problems and at the same
time sustain world-class research. This required innovations in research governance, a
new way of conceiving, organizing and managing research, and innovation. ‘Society’
was the name of a search for new interactions between universities, firms, and the state
from the point of view of the population. Documents, debates, and reportsab show that
the goal was not to put new products on the market in order to respond to a potential
demand expressed in buying power. The goal was to identify social needs and societal
demands, to try to satisfy these needs and lifestyles in order to create new products
and open markets from these new products and services. In this perspective, the neo-
liberal ‘market’ was not considered anymore the center of the social system. ‘Society’,
people in their daily life and problems, were becoming the center of the social system.
The problem was not anymore to reform the ‘national system of innovation’, to imple-
ment a Triple Helix, but to understand innovation from the point of view of individuals
and groups, to redesign the helix theory itself. In the early 2010s, debates and research
show that the problem was to negotiate and organize the emergence of a new
‘innovation ecosystem’ within society itself and from the point of view of society.
In this extended and revised version of the Helix theory, these issues and notions
were expressing a virtual evolution, real but still not implemented. To respond to
severe and multiple constraints, many Japanese researchers but also (younger) admi-
nistrators and politicians were ready for a real experiment: to learn how to associate
into a constructive debate various actors and partners from very different sectors and
with different interests and values. The 11 March 2011 Kanto and Tohoku earthquake
and the Fukushima catastrophe have obviously reinforced and justified the need for
such an evolution. But the Fukushima catastrophe, its impact on Japanese society and
economy, are so deep that the whole nation is transformed and transfixed. The com-
plexity of the new situation is so high that it is still today difficult to imagine where it
could lead. The catastrophe became institutional when the intricate networks of in-
terests, which made it possible and so severe, were revealed (Rieu 2013). The divide
between the population and its institutions is so deep that the basic compact and
trust holding a society together is profoundly shaken. Still, life continues but no
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In December 2012, a general election brought the Liberal Democratic Party back to
government. The conservative prime minister engaged strong proactive policies de-
signed to overcome the endless systemic crisis and set the Fukushima catastrophe in
the past. These policies intend to bring growth at any cost and, with growth, confi-
dence in the future.
A social scientist expresses the truth of this critical moment in Japanese history:
Kobayashi Tadashi, director of the Center for Communication Design at the University of
Osaka, a well-known specialist of sciences studies and deliberative democracyac. In June
2012, the Prime minister from the Democratic Party of Japan decided to organize a
nation-wide inquiry on the future of nuclear energy in Japan. It considered necessary that
the Japanese public reach an informed decision about nuclear energy as a basis for a new
energy policy. Kobayashi Tadashi and other specialists under the direction of Sone
Yasunoriad organized in a few weeks a National Deliberative Poll. Registered voters (6,849)
were selected at random and from them 285 participants were selected as a representative
sample of this group according to their demographic, geographic, social, and educational
background. The participants met at Keio University, Tokyo, on 4 to 5 August 2012.
Following rigorously James Fishkin's procedure (CDD 2012), the result was a typical case
of ‘informed decision’: between 60% and 70% of the participants declared supporting
‘a society less dependent on nuclear power plants’ (Kobayashi 2012). Based on this study,
the Japanese government decided on 14 September 2012 to end all nuclear energy pro-
duction by 2030ae.
But the government changed three months later: the new prime minister objected to
the study, which justified the decision of its predecessor, and announced that his
government would restart all nuclear plants when in agreement with the safety regula-
tions established after the accident. Ironically, it was announced early July 2014 that
nuclear plants would not produce electricity this summer and that no shortages were
expected. No one knows how many nuclear plants will be restarted, for how long, and
if any will ever be restarted. But what matters is different and reinforces my argument:
a nation-wide helix agreement has been reached in Japan. This agreement associates a
majority of civil society, politicians and members of the administration at the national
and local level, members of the academic community, and a large number of business
people, from the media to high technology. This aggregate is a political arrangement
between different helixes, like a reshaped DNA in an advanced industrial nation. The
message is clear: a new and extended version of the helix theory is potentially, already,
at work at the core of our social and economic systems.
Conclusions
Policy recommendations
The following remarks concern each case studied in this paper. These remarks do not
come from economics, sociology, or government studies. They come from science
studies, in a perspective strongly influenced by the work of Michel Foucault. Con-
cerning France, the power structure controlling research and teaching activities will not
change in the near future. There is not even a will to study the situation with appro-
priate conceptual means. The taboo is the centralized national republican ideal. Science
and technology policy and university reforms remain a domain managed in the end
Rieu Triple Helix 2014, 1:8 Page 18 of 22
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1186/s40604-014-0008-8according to national interest and sovereignty. The various projects to organize re-
gional poles or communities of research, innovation, and teaching have failed and will
fail in the near future because they intensify conflicts of interest and power at all levels.
The best solution is to learn from the case of Germany. The idea is not to replicate
the German model but to evaluate the German example and to learn from this eva-
luation. What is at stake is to find and negotiate the appropriate level of a spontaneous
Triple Helix, the level at which a positive negotiation and cooperation become possible
between the administration (elected and non-elected officials), the research and higher
education institutions (universities, professional schools in business, engineering, etc.),
and the business community in its diversity. This local Triple Helix is the active core of
a ‘cluster’.
Administrative divisions or cultural history do not define in advance this appropriate
local level. These ‘clusters’ are not predetermined territories: they are established
around a local Triple Helix. Because this local TH is new, an ongoing negotiation, it
can have partners outside its geographical location. This is clearly a version of various
economic discourses dating back to Alfred Marshall. It is different from Italian
‘industrial districts’ often anchored in a long history. This is not the level at which large
and well-established firms usually operate, but they often maintain a strong local commit-
ment. On the other hand, small and medium firms operate at this level: they are created
at this level and they require strong collaboration with all people and organizations in-
volved in a local helix arrangement. Finally, at the level best fitted for an innovation policy,
all Triple Helix have a fourth helix and even many other helixes. In order to keep its heur-
istic value, the Triple Helix should simply become the Helix theory.
In the perspective of this paper, a lot can be learned from the case of Japan. In
many ways, Japan is a continuous experiment, often against its own will. An interes-
ting change and experiment happened between 2006 and 2008. As explained above,
it became clear that innovation policies undertaken since 1996 had to be reoriented.
The search for competitiveness was endless, mimetic, and in the end counterpro-
ductive. The imagined potential consumer somewhere in this world, reduced to its
buying power, might belong to the past. The solution was to search for new condi-
tions and sources of innovation and to turn to the local level, to society and everyday
life, to the real needs and desires of consumers, and to the changing lifestyles and
collective problems of the Japanese population. Responding to these needs, behaviors
and desires had the potential to profile new products and services, which could be
designed, produced, and sold worldwide. This experiment was suspended, but not
forgotten, after 11 March 2011. This Japanese experiment (and others) remarkably
fits the role of local TH arrangements. A similar awareness and method should guide
those who understand the role and responsibility of local TH arrangements, the re-
search and debate it requires.
Because of its territorial, cultural, and economic diversity, France could greatly
profit from this approach. It would directly confront its political and administrative
structure. It would entail that research and innovation activities reshape their rela-
tions with politics and the economy. The point is that a new level of collaborative
activities specialized in research and innovation is emerging, with its own geo-
graphy and requirements. But Japan could also profit from the cases of France
and Germany. Germany could learn from the case of Japan that its real long-term
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innovation. Finally these ‘clusters’ should tend to create their own networks in
order to stimulate innovation: what counts is not the information, which circulates,
but the capacity of local Helix arrangements to transform information into
innovation for a population.Methods
The method is first qualitative in a conceptual frame derived from the present state of
science, studies focusing on the impact of the institutional environment in the context of the
present systemic crisis and the constant call for innovation. The Triple Helix concept and
related problems are derived from the work of H. Etzkowitz and L. Leydesdorff. In this
study, the use of this concept includes the research field opened by Michel Foucault,
mainly his conception of “power” and “governmentality”. Secondly, the method is to
analyze in this conceptual frame the case of France by setting it into comparison. The
Triple Helix concept is not taken as a norm but as a heuristic model under constant revi-
sion. The case of France is confronted with the case of Germany. Thirdly, the method is
to draw conclusions in order to lead the research further. Comparing these two cases
opens a criticism of the standard Triple Helix theory when it is used as a norm to study,
manage and reform innovation processes. Typically a crucial debate in the Triple Helix
theory is to include « society » as a fourth helix. The problem is to define what “society”
really means in this context. An answer is found in studying the evolution of Japan’s re-
search policies since 2008. As conclusions, the policy recommendations show how the
three cases under study benefit from such an analysis. It also concludes that the Triple
Helix theory might be turning into a Helix Theory.Endnotes
aA recent Accenture report by Harris and Junglas (2013), ‘Decoding the contradictory
culture of Silicon Valley’, compared its ecosystem to Tasmania or Madagascar in order
to reinforce its exceptionality.
bLocal replica have been experimented, the best known is Sophia Antipolis, close to
Nice in Southern France. France has many different high-tech valleys, corridors, and
one plateau, the Plateau de Saclay, often called in France the ‘European Silicon Valley.’
Silicon Valley is a compulsory pilgrimage for French high officials.
cSee Examens de l'OCDE des politiques d'innovation: France, summary in English
(OECD 2014). This report is based on the National System of Innovation theory, not on
the Triple Helix theory. It generally confirms my analysis, but does not provide an effect-
ive explanation of French shortcomings because it does not take into account
the impact of ‘power networks.’ The report is concerned with governance, not with
governmentality (in a sense derived from the work of Michel Foucault), which introduces
a perspective taking into account power networks and their strategies. But this report pro-
vides a detailed description of French research, education, and innovation institutions.
dFor instance at the 1998 Triple Helix Congress in New York. Most authors of the
above OECD report are from the Ecole des mines.
eAll the various institutions compositing the state and expressing its various functions
and range of interests in a given society.
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g« et aux énergies renouvelables » (and renewable energies) was added in due time.
hMichel Callon's Center for the Sociology of Innovation at the Ecole des mines in Paris
had for goal to bring light in this black box.
iThis includes the OECD (2014) report Examens de l'OCDE des politiques d'innovation:
France. The French state apparatus has even created its own ‘science’ and ‘technology’.
The Ecole nationale d’administration (ENA) is a professional school dedicated to teach
the grounds, the organization, the methods, and the values of the French state apparatus
and to train students in its management.
jElection to national academies, consultancy jobs for government and international
institutions, prestigious nominations, etc.
kSee for instance the composition in this Spring 2014 of the Research Strategic Council
(Conseil stratégique de la recherche): http://www.oecd.org/france/2014.07%20Better_
Policies_Series_France.pdf. Each individual member is of course highly respectable
but, because of its composition, the conclusions of such a council are necessarily so broad
and general that the high administration controls in the end the policy.
lExemplified by Airbus, the SNCF and its TGV, the nuclear and other utilities com-
panies, like EDF, Vinci (‘world leading concession and construction group’), etc.
mSee Hecht (2004). Nuclear plants produce around 75% of electricity in France and
around 23% in Japan before Fukushima.
nSee the Nora-Minc Report (1978), commissioned by President Giscard d’Estaing
(1974 to 1981).
oIn search of economic growth and political support, President François Holland decided
on 10 January 2013 to allocate 150 million Euros for « disruptive innovation » (innovations
de rupture). On 8 April 2013, the government created a commission on innovation under
the direction of Anne Lauvergeon, former student at the Ecole des mines and former
president of Areva, now board member of various big firms. In the report published on 18
October 2013 (http://www.direccte.gouv.fr/consultez-le-rapport-lauvergeon.html), the two
pages on innovation are pure rhetoric and the seven development targets for the
French economy are those found in all other industrial nations. See also two reports
under the direction of Louis Beffa: with minor adaptations, they simply justify the
existing situation.
pSee Journal official (2010).
qI follow various studies by Hilpert (2003, 2006, 2014).
rhttp://www.bmwi.de/EN/Topics/Technology/hightech-strategy.html.
sThe Région Rhône-Alpes may be the most interesting case in France. Grenoble is an
effective successful case of Triple Helix arrangement. See Vincent Mangematin's work-
shop with Henry Etzkowitz, The micro-foundations of Triple Helix, Grenoble Business
School, 26 to 27 May 2014.
tWhat is at stake is the historical trajectory of the French state, which constructed
itself in order to counterbalance these centrifugal forces.
uConcerning the rivalry between England and France and its consequences, see Hahn
(1971).
vThe theory of reverse innovation (Huet 2014) shares the same concern with diversity. Helix
arrangements are the acting core of a national system of innovation and of local ‘clusters’
(Forest and Hamdouch 2009). Because they are connective and flexible, they convey diversity.
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http://link.springer.com/article/10.1186/s40604-014-0008-8wFor instance, the causes and consequences of the Fukushima catastrophe are so
wide and deep, of such a high level of complexity, that it is clear that a reformed
political function is necessary to manage the situation. See Rieu (2012b, 2013)
xFor a more precise analysis, see Rieu (2012a) ‘Beyond neoliberalism: research policies
and society. The case of Japan’.
ySee NISTEP website: www.nistep.go.jp/.
zThe most accurate diagnosis and detailed analysis is a study by Watanabe (2009).
aaI have drawn from articles, discussions, and presentations by Arimoto Tateo,
director of the Research Institute of Science and Technology for Society (RISTEX), Japan
Science and Technology Agency, and by Mrs. Harayama Yuko, Tohoku University,
former OECD vice-director for science and technology and advisor to Prime ministers
Koizumi and Abe. See Arimoto (2006).
abSee the RISTEX website: http://www.ristex.jp/EN/.
acConcerning the work of Kobayashi Tadashi, see Michel Callon in Callon et al.
(2001, 2009).
adDirector, Center for Deliberative democracy, Keio University, Tokyo.
aeSee CDD (2012) for links with various newspapers articles.
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